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Emotions strongly influence our decisions, particularly those made under risk. A classic
example of the effect of emotion on decision making under risk is the “framing effect,”
which involves predictable shifts in preferences when the same problem is formulated in
different ways. According to dual process theories, this bias could stem from an affective
heuristic belonging to an intuitive type of reasoning. In this study, we examined whether
specific incidental negative emotions (i.e., fear and anger) influence framing susceptibility
and risk-taking identically. In each trial, participants received an initial amount of money,
and pictures of angry or fearful faces were presented to them. Finally, participants chose
between a sure option and a gamble option of equally expected value in a gain or loss
frame. Risk-taking was modulated by emotional context: fear and anger influenced risk-
taking specifically in the gain frame and had opposite effects. Fear increased risk-averse
choices, whereas anger decreased risk-averse choices, leading to a suppression of the
framing effect. These results confirm that emotions play a key role in framing susceptibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision making under risk is based on an appraisal of different
options offering various probabilities of winning and outcome
values. Intuition and emotions appear to play important roles in
this process, sometimes leading to decisional errors (Lerner and
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Houdé and Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003; Evans,
2008; Blanchette and Richards, 2010; Cassotti et al., 2012; De
Neys and Bonnefon, 2013). A well-known decisional bias is the
violation of the description invariance principle (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). According to
this principle, preferences among prospects should not be affected
by variations in the irrelevant features of the options, such as
how they are described. However, converging evidence demon-
strates predictable shifts in preferences when a given problem is
framed in different ways, i.e., the “framing effect” (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981; De Martino et al., 2006; Cassotti et al., 2012).
Classically, a framing effect occurs when participants make more
risk-seeking choices when the outcome is formulated in terms of
losses than when it is formulated in terms of gains (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981).
Many authors have postulated that decisional biases arise from
a competition between two distinct types of reasoning, i.e., an
intuitive-heuristic form of reasoning—Type 1, and an executive-
analytic form of mental operations—Type 2 (Sloman, 1996; De
Neys, 2006; Evans, 2011; Kahneman, 2012). The Type 1 pro-
cessing operates quickly, has a high capacity and is independent
of working memory and cognitive ability. On the other hand,
the Type 2 processing is relatively slow, has a lower capacity
and is heavily dependent on working memory and related to
individual differences in cognitive ability (Evans, 2011). In some
daily situation, a competition can arise between both types of
reasoning and the relying on the Type 1 can conduct to decisional
biases. According to Kahneman and Frederick (2007), the framing
effect occurs because of an affective heuristic that belongs to Type
1 processing and conducts to a shift of preferences according
to the formulation of the options (intuitive-heuristic behavior),
thereby violating the invariance principle (analytic behavior).
This affective heuristic arises from a strong attractiveness of the
sure gains on the one hand, and a high aversion of the sure
losses on the other hand. Recent neuroimaging and behavioral
studies have provided evidence in support of this assumption
(De Martino et al., 2006; Cheung and Mikels, 2011; Cassotti
et al., 2012). In a study by De Martino et al. (2006), in each
trial, the participants were given an initial amount of money
(e.g., 50£) and were confronted with a choice between a sure
outcome and a gamble of equally expected value, represented
as a “wheel of fortune.” The sure prospect was framed in one
of two ways: in the gain frame, the participants could “keep”
a part of the initial amount (e.g., keep 20£), and in the loss
frame, the participants could “lose” a part of the initial amount
(e.g., lose 30£). Thus, the expected values were identical for
the sure and gamble options in both frames. Greater activation
of the amygdala, a brain region reported to play an important
role in the processing of emotional stimuli (see for example
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Van Den Bulk et al., 2014), was reported when the participants
demonstrated a typical framing effect. Thus, the participant’s
tendency to be susceptible to the frame seems to be significantly
related to emotional processes, supporting the hypothesis that
the framing effect is driven by an affective heuristic (Type 1—
De Martino et al., 2006). Conversely, the participants’ ability to
control this bias and run counter to the framing effect (Type
2)—operationalized by a “rationality index”—was related to the
degree of orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex and ante-
rior cingulate cortex activation. These results suggest that the
ability to resist to the framing effect is based on the detection
of a conflict between a heuristic choice and an analytic choice
and on the inhibition of the impulsive response. Meanwhile,
the orbito-medial prefrontal cortex enables to integrate emo-
tional and cognitive information (as the expected value of each
choice) which in turns lead to a more rational behavior. Thus,
the framing effect occurs when intuitive-emotional reactions
interfere with one’s ability to reason according to the invariance
principle (De Martino et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick,
2007).
Behavioral studies exploring the influence of emotional reg-
ulation and incidental emotions on framing susceptibility have
also provided converging evidence that the framing effect could
stem from an affective heuristic belonging to an intuitive type
of reasoning. In a framing task adapted from De Martino et al.
(2006), Cheung and Mikels (2011) demonstrated that risk-taking
decreased significantly compared to a standard control condition
when the participants were asked to “not let their emotions influ-
ence their choices” (emotion-regulation condition). In addition,
risk-taking was related to the extent to which the participants
stated that they relied on their emotions when making their
choices. In a second experiment, the participants rated how they
felt about their decision (i.e., from very negative to very positive).
Positive affect increased risk taking in the loss frame, but not in
the gain frame, whereas negative affect had no effect (Cheung and
Mikels, 2011). Finally, one study directly investigated the effects
of positive and negative incidental emotions on the framing effect
(Cassotti et al., 2012). Incidental emotions, in contrast to integral
emotions, refer to emotions that arise from task-irrelevant factors
such as participants’ emotional states (Blanchette and Richards,
2010; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013). In this study, the participants
performed a classical framing task adapted from De Martino et al.
(2006), in which pleasant or unpleasant pictures were presented
before each choice. The incidental positive emotional context
reduced risk-taking in the loss frame and led to a suppression
of the framing effect. Thus, the positive context seems to reduce
the affective impact of a sure loss and consequently reduce loss
aversion. Consistent with Cheung and Mikels (2011), the inci-
dental negative context did not influence framing susceptibility.
The opposite impact of positive emotions on risk taking in the
loss frame could be attributed to methodological differences in
the evaluation and the impact of positive emotions. Cheung
and Mikels (2011) evaluated affective ratings about participant’s
choice, whereas Cassotti et al. (2012) manipulated an incidental
emotional context—i.e., irrelevant for the task at hand—by pre-
senting pictures with a positive emotional content before every
trial.
Together, these results suggest that relying on affects, partic-
ularly positive affect, influences risk-taking in the framing task,
and reinforce the view that the framing effect arises from an
affective heuristic. However, the absence of an effect of nega-
tive emotions on the framing effect could initially appear to be
surprising because of the many studies that have emphasized
the significant effect of negative emotions on decision making
(e.g., Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Blanchette and Richards, 2010).
For instance, the neural circuitry of fear and anxiety (i.e., the
amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex) strongly overlaps
with the neural circuitry involved in decision making and framing
susceptibility (Hartley and Phelps, 2012). The Appraisal Tendency
Framework (ATF; Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001) could pro-
vide a possible explanation for the absence of an effect of the
negative emotional context on framing susceptibility (Cheung
and Mikels, 2011; Cassotti et al., 2012). According to the ATF,
specific emotions can differently affect judgment and risk-taking
tendencies in function of their appraisal patterns. For example,
fear and anger are two basic emotions with negative valence,
but fear is associated with a sense of uncertainty and a tendency
to perceive situational control in new situations, while anger is
associated with a sense of certainty and individual control (see
Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Kuppens et al., 2003; for comparative
influence of fear and anger). Therefore, fearful people should
perceive greater risk across new situations. This perception will
push them to be more risk-averse. Angry people should perceive
less risk in new situations, their optimistic risk assessment should
lead them to be more risk-seeking (Lerner and Keltner, 2000).
Previous studies that investigated the effects of negative emotions
on framing susceptibility did not account for the distinct and
opposite influences of these two negative emotions. Cassotti et al.
(2012) and Cheung and Mikels (2011) suggested that additional
studies would be necessary to determine the effect of specific
negative emotions on the framing effect.
Thus, if we want to fully understand the effects of emotions on
decision making, we have to go beyond mere valence and inves-
tigate the effect of specific emotions. Investigating the specific
influence of negative emotions would provide crucial information
to better understand how negative emotions can influence risk-
seeking behaviors in the framing effect. Using questionnaires
assessing dispositional fear and anger, state affect and risk percep-
tion, Lerner and Keltner (2000) have demonstrated that fearful
and angry individuals tend to assess differently the level of risk
of their environment. Fear predicted higher risk assessments and
fearful individuals expressed a preference for the sure option
in the Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
In contrast, angry individuals perceived lower risk and chose
predominantly the risky option (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001).
However, the transitory effects of fear and anger—produced by an
emotional context—on risk-taking have not yet been studied.
The present study investigated whether specific incidental
emotions (i.e., fear and anger) differently influenced framing sus-
ceptibility in risky choices and risk-taking in a monetary framing
task. The participants were presented with either a picture of
a fearful or angry face before choosing between a sure option
(keeping or losing a given amount of money, in the gain and
the loss frames, respectively) or a risky option (i.e., gamble the
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entire amount of money). Consistent with the ATF, we assumed
that fear and anger would influence risk-taking in opposite ways.
Incidental fear should decrease risk-taking (i.e., more sure option
choices), whereas incidental anger should increase risk-taking
(i.e., more risky option choices). In the control condition (no




Sixty-seven undergraduate university students (M = 21.75 years,
SD = 1.90, 32 men) volunteered to participate in this study. All
participants were naive regarding the experimental aims and were
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions.
They were not monetarily rewarded in exchange for their par-
ticipation. Participants were tested in accordance with national
and international norms governing the use of human research
participants and gave their informed consent before participating
to the study.
PROCEDURE
The participants completed a computerized gambling task
adapted from Cassotti et al. (2012). The experiment employed
three conditions: an incidental fear condition, an incidental anger
condition and a control condition. In the fear and anger condi-
tions, each choice was preceded by the presentation of a fearful or
an angry face. In the control condition, no face was presented.
During the practice session, the participants were familiarized
with the gambling task and provided two practice trials. During
the test session, the participants performed 70 trials: 25 trials
framed in terms of gain, 25 trials framed in terms of loss and
20 catch trials. In each trial, they were provided with an initial
amount of money for 2,500 ms (e.g., 50e) and then asked to
choose between a sure option and a gamble option (see Figure 1).
The gamble option was a wheel of fortune, depicting the prob-
ability of winning or losing the entire initial amount. The sure
option could be formulated differently according to the frame. In
the gain frame, the participants could “keep” a part of the initial
amount (e.g., keep 20e), and in the loss frame, the participants
could “lose” a part of the initial amount (e.g., lose 30e).
For the 50 test trials, expected values were identical for the
sure and gamble options, and the framing conditions were math-
ematically equivalent. The initial amount varied between 10 and
50ein increments of 10e. For each amount of money and frame,
the probabilities of winning in the gamble options ranged from
30 to 70% in increments of 10%. The 20 catch trials were trials
FIGURE 1 | Examples of trials presented in the gain and loss frames with
an incidental emotional context of fear or anger. In each trial, the
participants received an initial amount of money depicted by a monopoly bill
(e.g., 50e). A picture from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al.,
2009) was then presented: a fearful face in the incidental fear condition and
an angry face in the incidental anger condition. Finally, the participants chose
between a sure and a gamble option of equally expected value in a gain frame
or in a loss frame.
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with noticeably different expected values between the sure and
gamble options. In one-half of these trials, the gamble option
was highly preferable, and for the other one-half of the trials, the
sure option was preferable (e.g., a 10% probability of winning by
choosing the gamble option versus a sure choice of 50% of the
initial amount). The catch trials were designed to ensure that the
participants were actively engaged in the task. The participants
who obtained a percentage of success lower than 85% on the catch
trials were excluded from the final sample (see Talmi et al., 2010).
Two participants from the control condition and one from the
incidental fear condition were excluded from the study. Thus, the
final sample was composed of 22 participants in the incidental
anger condition, 20 participants in the incidental fear condition,
and 21 participants in the control group without emotional
context.
In the incidental fear and the incidental anger conditions,
pictures of faces were displayed for 3,000 ms after the presentation
of the initial amount, with a fearful face in the incidental fear
condition and an angry face in the incidental anger condition (see
Figure 1). We selected 35 pictures of faces with a fearful expression
and 35 with an angry expression (17 men and 18 women) from
the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009). We
selected pictures of faces for which the emotions were correctly
identified by over 70% of the participants.
MANIPULATION CHECK
To determine whether the presentation of emotional faces could
create incidental emotional contexts in the framing task (i.e.,
fear and anger contexts), we conducted a control study on 26
participants (mean age = 21.67 ± 1.09, 11 men). Participants
were instructed to look at the pictures of faces presented on
a computer screen. As in the framing task, each picture was
displayed for 3,000 ms. Participants either saw the 35 fear-
ful faces or the 35 angry faces presented in the framing task.
Before and after presentation of the pictures, the participants
were asked to rate on a 10-point scale to what extent each of
17 mood adjectives characterized their current emotional state
(adapted from the Brief Mood Behavioral scale, see Mayer and
Gaschke, 1988). We restricted our analyses to the ratings on
the “fearful” and “angry” items. A 2 (facial expression: fearful
vs. angry) × 2 (mood adjectives: fearful vs. angry) × 2 (con-
ditions: pre-test vs. post-test) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
the ratings revealed a significant three-way interaction between
facial expression, mood adjectives and condition, F(1,22) = 9.27,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.30: participants reported being more fearful
after the presentation of fearful faces (M = 1.42 ± 1.08 in the
pre-test and M = 3.5 ± 2.07 in the post-test), t(11) = 3.57,
p < 0.005, d = 1.26, but not more angry (M = 1.17, ± 1.11 in
the pre-test and M = 1.75 ± 1.96 in the post-test), t(11) = 1.17
p = 0.53. In contrast, participants reported being more angry
after the presentation of angry faces (M = 2 ± 2 in the pre-test
and M = 3 ± 2.09 in the post-test), t(11) = 2.71, p < 0.05,
d = 0.49, but not more fearful (M = 1.25 ± 1.49 in the
pre-test and M = 1.25 ± 1.71 in the post-test), t < 1 (all
p-values were corrected with a Bonferroni procedure). Thus,
we are confident that, in the framing task, the presentation of
the fearful faces created an incidental fearful context and that
the presentation of the angry faces created an incidental anger
context.
RESULTS
To evaluate the effect of the incidental emotional context on risk-
seeking in both frames, we conducted a 3 (conditions: incidental
fear vs. incidental anger vs. control; between-participants fac-
tor) × 2 (frames: gain vs. loss; within-participants factor) × 5
(magnitude of outcomes: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50) mixed-design
ANOVA. This analysis revealed a typical framing effect; the
participants more frequently chose the gamble option in the
loss frame (M = 54.9 ± 17.2%) compared to the gain frame
(M = 36.8 ± 21.7%) when the three conditions were considered
together, F(1,61) = 64.07, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.51. The main
effect of condition was not significant, F(2,61) = 2.87, p = 0.064.
Notably, the participants chose the gamble option in the gain and
loss frames to different extents in the three conditions, as reflected
by the significant interaction between condition and frame,
F(2,61)= 9.84, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.24. However, the mixed-design
ANOVA did not reveal any significant interaction between condi-
tion and magnitude of outcomes, F = 1.46, p= 0.17, nor between
condition, frame and magnitude of outcomes, F = 1.59, p= 0.13.
In the gain frame, the planned comparisons revealed that
the participants more frequently chose the gamble option in
the incidental anger condition than in the control condition
(M = 50.4 ± 23.8% and M = 35.8 ± 19.5%, respectively),
t(61) = 2.07, p < 0.05, d = 0.67. The participants also more
frequently chose the gamble option in the gain frame in the
control than in the incidental fear condition (M = 35.8 ± 19.5%
and M = 24.8 ± 14.2%, respectively), t(61) = 1.78, p < 0.05,
d = 0.64 (see Figure 2). Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s
Honestly Significant Difference tests revealed that the partici-
pants more frequently chose the gamble option in the loss frame
(M = 57.6± 11.6%) than in the gain frame (M = 24.8± 14.2%)
in the incidental fear condition, p < 0.001, d = 2.5. Similarly,
in the control condition, the proportion of the chosen gamble
option was higher in the loss frame (M = 51 ± 16.5%) than the
gain frame (M = 35.8 ± 19.5%), p < 0.01, d = 0.84. In contrast
to the two other conditions, we observed no framing effect in the
incidental anger condition, (M = 58 ± 21.4% in the loss frame
and M = 50.4 ± 23.8% in the gain frame), p = 0.32, d = 0.34.
Risk-seeking did not differ across the three conditions in the loss
frame, all ps > 0.10.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the influence
of specific incidental negative emotions (i.e., fear and anger)
on framing susceptibility and risk-seeking behaviors. Therefore,
before they made their decision, the participants were presented
with pictures of faces with either fearful or angry expressions.
Critically, fear and anger have opposite effects on risk-taking in
the gain frame, which in turn modulates the amplitude of the
framing effect.
First, the participants in the control condition gambled more
frequently in the loss frame than in the gain frame, a typical fram-
ing effect, which replicates previous findings (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981; De Martino et al., 2006; Cassotti et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 2 | The percentage of risky choices in the incidental fear condition, control condition and incidental anger condition in the gain and the loss
frames, *p < 0.05, **p = 0.005, ***p < 0.001, ns = not significant.
Second, in the incidental fear condition, we observed an increase
of risk-averse choices in the gain frame compared to the control
condition. Due to this increase, the framing effect was larger in
the incidental fear condition compared to the control condition.
Third, in the incidental anger condition, the decrease of risk-
averse choices in the gain frame led to a suppression of the
framing effect; after having seen angry faces, the participants were
no longer affected by the formulation of the options, i.e., the
proportion of risky choices did not differ across the frames. In this
condition, the absence of a framing effect was due to an increase
in risk-taking in the gain frame. This result further suggests that
an incidental context of anger can significantly contribute to
increased risk-taking, as predicted by the ATF (Lerner and Kelt-
ner, 2000, 2001). Thus, the effects of incidental negative emotions
reported in this study confirm previous results demonstrating that
fear and anger affect risk-aversion in opposite ways (Lerner and
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Kugler et al., 2012).
According to the ATF (Lerner and Keltner, 2000), fear is
defined by a better perception of uncertainty and situational
control, whereas anger is defined by a better perception of cer-
tainty and individual control. As certainty and control are two
factors that greatly influence risk perception and risk taking,
fearful and angry people should demonstrate opposite patterns
of risk taking. The results obtained in this study extended this
question by investigated the transient effect of incidental fear and
anger. In the current study, participants in the incidental fear
condition are less prone to risk taking, whereas participants in
the incidental anger condition demonstrate an increase of risky
choices in the gain frame compared to participants in the control
condition. According to the ATF, these differences in risk taking
patterns confirm that incidental fear contributes to an increase of
risk perception whereas incidental anger reduces risk perception,
which leads to an increase of gambling choices. However, these
results are restricted to the gain frame.
The incidental fear and anger conditions did not influence
risk taking in the loss frame compared to the control condition.
These results are in contradiction with the ones obtained by
Lerner and Keltner (2001) and cannot be fully explained by the
ATF framework. However, their work has examined the impact
of trait-fear and trait-anger on risk-taking whereas the present
study investigated the impact of the emotional context in which
the decision is occurring. One possible explanation could be that
anger and fear have differential impacts on risk perception, but
only when the intuitive heuristic does not already exert a strong
influence on risk perception. In the loss frame, the increase of
risk taking is the result of a strong loss aversion which leads to a
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preference for avoiding a sure loss, regardless of the probability
of obtaining a gain while gambling. The powerful aversion to
losses seems to have a stronger impact on risk perception than
the incidental context manipulated by the presentation of fearful
faces. Loss aversion leads to such a strong tendency to choose
the risky option in the loss frame that the incidental fear cannot
reduce risk taking. The absence of impact of the incidental anger
condition could be explained by a ceiling effect of risky choices in
the loss frame, as the percentage of risky choices observed in this
study is at the same level as that observed in previous studies (De
Martino et al., 2006; Talmi et al., 2010; Cheung and Mikels, 2011;
Cassotti et al., 2012).
An alternative explanation for our findings might be found in
the approach/avoidance framework. While fear has been associ-
ated with avoidance behaviors, anger is an approach motivated
affect (Adams et al., 2006; Peterson and Harmon-Jones, 2012).
Therefore, exposure to emotional context of fear might induce
avoidance behaviors and then increase the likelihood of making
risky decisions. In contrast, an emotional context of anger might
induce approach behaviors and then decrease risky decisions.
Although our results in the gain frame are in accordance with
prediction of the approach/avoidance view, this model failed to
fully explain the lack of emotional context effect in the loss frame.
In addition, there is still a debate regarding whether fear triggers
avoidance or approach behaviors (Hammer and Marsh, 2015).
Another possible explanation is that positive emotions have an
impact on loss-aversion, whereas negative emotions have an influ-
ence on risk aversion. Previous studies have shown that positive
emotions influence decision making in the loss frame (Cheung
and Mikels, 2011; Cassotti et al., 2012). The preference for the
gamble option in the loss frame is the result of loss-aversion
that drives people to avoid sure losses. Thus, positive emotions
may influence the disposition to loss aversion. Alternatively, this
study seems to indicate that negative emotions influence decision
making specifically in the gain frame. The preference for the sure
option in the gain frame results from risk-aversion driving people
to prefer a sure gain to a risky option of the same expected value.
Thus, fear and anger seem to influence risk-aversion in opposite
ways—risk-aversion increases in the incidental fear condition,
whereas it decreases in the incidental anger condition—but do
not influence loss-aversion. Heilman et al. (2010) have previously
shown that naturally occurring negative emotions influence risk-
aversion when confronted with a task of decision making under
uncertainty, the Balloon Analog Risk Task. Further experiments
are required to better understand which processes are involved
in decision making when participants are confronted with an
incidental negative context compared to an incidental positive
context.
Together, these results reinforce the view that emotions play
a crucial role in framing susceptibility (De Martino et al., 2006;
Kahneman and Frederick, 2007) and extend previous results
demonstrating that an incidental context could significantly influ-
ence susceptibility to framing (Cassotti et al., 2012). Further-
more, the current study provides evidence that different negative
incidental emotional contexts (i.e., fear and anger) have oppo-
site effects on risk-aversion tendencies. These results emphasize
the importance of investigating the effect of specific negative
emotions on decision making. That said, we do not yet have
evidence that these contexts affect the participants’ ability to
recognize the formal equivalence of the two frames (gain vs. loss).
Thus, further investigations are required to determine whether
these contexts influence participants’ emotional reactivity to gains
and losses or their ability to overcome the framing effect. The
measure of the skin conductance response and of the ability to
express a differential autonomic response according to the frame
could shed some light on the specific influences of the emotional
context (De Martino et al., 2008). We could also use emotional
and motivational scales to determine whether these results reflect
changes in motivational drives, in appraisal tendencies, in the sub-
jective value attributed to the options or in approach/avoidance
tendencies.
Framing effects and people’s risk preferences vary as a function
of task domains and according to the type of framing effect
(Levin et al., 1998). Thus, it could be of great interest to examine
whether the effects of incidental fear and anger evidenced in the
current study can be replicated in other task domains (e.g., human
lifesaving or personal money) or other framing effects (Levin
et al., 1998).
A possible limitation of the present study concerns the absence
of monetary incentives in the decisional task. However, the 20
catch trials allowed us to determine whether the participants
were actively engaged in the task. Note that the participants
who obtained a percentage of success lower than 85% on these
catch trials were excluded from the final sample. In addition,
the absence of real incentives is unlikely to explain the difference
observed between the different incidental emotional conditions.
Finally, studies offering no monetary incentives have reported the
same pattern of results (see, e.g., Whitney et al., 2008; Reyna et al.,
2011; Cassotti et al., 2012) as those offering monetary incentives
(De Martino et al., 2006; Talmi et al., 2010; Cheung and Mikels,
2011).
CONCLUSION
In summary, the current study is the first to provide empirical
evidence for a role of negative incidental emotions on risk-
aversion in the framing effect by showing that two incidental
emotions of negative valence have opposite effects on risk seeking.
Incidental fear increased risk-averse choices, whereas incidental
anger increased risk-seeking and consequently led to a sup-
pression of the framing effect. Notably, both negative emotions
affected risk-aversion specifically in the gain frame. These results
offer an experimental complement to the neuroimaging study by
De Martino et al. (2006) and previous behavioral investigations
(Cheung and Mikels, 2011; Cassotti et al., 2012) underlying the
role of emotions in framing susceptibility.
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